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Abstract: In response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, there is an ever-increasing 
number of national governments that are rolling out contact-tracing Apps to aid the containment of 
the virus. The first hugely contentious issue facing the Apps is the deployment framework, i.e. 
centralised or decentralised. Based on this, the debate branches out to the corresponding 
technologies that underpin these architectures, i.e. GPS, QR codes, and Bluetooth. This work 
conducts a pioneering review of the above scenarios and contributes a geolocation mapping of the 
current deployment. The vulnerabilities and the directions of research are identified, with a special 
focus on the Bluetooth-based decentralised scheme. 
Keywords: contact tracing app; coronavirus; COVID-19; decentralised; health informatics; 
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1. Introduction 
In the recent few months, contact-tracing Apps have emerged and pushed the boundary of 
innovations in response to the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) [1]. A contact-tracing App [2] 
is a mobile platform that assists the identification of people who may have come into contact with an 
infected person, and the subsequent collection of further information about these contacts for 
containing the virus’ spreading. There is an ongoing debate on the deployment of the Apps 
regarding their technology framework, i.e. centralised [3,4] versus decentralised [5,6], and their 
corresponding sensor technologies, i.e. the Global Positioning System (GPS) integrated with Quick 
Response (QR) codes scanning [7,8] and big data analysis [9,10], versus the wireless Bluetooth 
devices [11] enabled by microwave [12,13] and millimetre-wave [14–17] communications.  
In the centralised architecture, personal data collected through the App is controlled by 
government authority. These Apps mainly follow the PEPP-PT (Pan-European Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing) [18] protocol, but the consensus amongst the technical community is that this 
framework is too academic for practical development. For the decentralized approach, the personal 
data is enclosed or controlled by individuals only on personal devices. These Apps follow the DP-3T 
(Decentralised Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) [19] data protection solution recently 
developed by the European Academics. However, this framework is only partially decentralised, i.e. 
there is an anonymous centralised database for only the infected people. Google and Apple in 
partnership [20] will launch an exclusive decentralised framework in May which will be more 
compatible with the Android and iOS systems. Regarding the technologies and infrastructures that 
underpin the two architectures, GPS is based on crowd mapping for tracking the spread of the 
COVID-19, while the QR codes scanning approach is combined with physical temperature testing 
equipment to track the healthy or infected individuals’ movement on public transport. The 
Bluetooth method detects other devices retained for a certain amount of time within a certain range 
of distance, and notifies the devices which have had sufficient contacts with the infected individual's 
device, assuming that the infected individuals report their anonymous infection states to the 
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App. Researchers from Oxford [21] recently modelled and proposed a threshold on the active user 
rates (at least 60%) for the App to fully deliver its valuable insights for the government to contain the 
virus. There is arguably a growing trend globally and especially in Europe that the decentralised 
architecture would be preferable. 
 
2. Survey of the Data Regulations and Technology Protocols 
Keeping personal data safe and secure is one of the greatest challenges posed by the rapid 
development of today’s health informatics. The up-to-date regulations and frameworks are detailed 
in Fig. 1, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [22,23], as well as the key 
competing architectures that have been mentioned in section 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. High-level summary of the data regulations and technology protocols for the current 
COVID-19 contact-tracing Apps. 
 
3. Systematic Mapping of the Global Deployment Status for the COVID-19 Contact-tracing Apps 
We produce the first geolocation mapping for the global deployment of the COVID-19 
contact-tracing apps in Fig. 2, with the format codes in an order of the country name, App name, the 
number of users (download times), and the underpinning technologies (GPS, QR codes, Bluetooth). 
The color of the country represents the employed framework, i.e. with purple denoting the 
centralised architecture, while grey representing the decentralised (or being migrating into the 
decentralised framework).  
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Figure 2. Systematic mapping study into the global deployment of the contact-tracing Apps for 
COVID-19 (format codes order: country name, App/SDK name, download times/user numbers). 
Following a software vulnerability-mapping analysis paradigm [24], the flaws of each 
contact-tracing Apps are analysed and summarised in Fig. 3 below. For instance, one of the key 
non-technical but important questions for the UK NHS COVID-19 tracking App is the fault positives 
(i.e. what if people without concern for COVID-19 maliciously report a positive using the App) and 
the fault negatives (i.e. what if infected people do not report their cases in the App).  
 
 
Figure 3. Vulnerabilities analysis of the current COVID-19 contact-tracing Apps. 
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4. Challenges and Research Directions for Bluetooth based Contact Tracking Technologies 
As observed from Figs. 2 and 3 above, Bluetooth (either in centralised or decentralised 
framework) has accounted for 57% of all the tracking technologies, as compared with the GPS (43%), 
which merits a further analysis into both the technical and geopolitical characteristics. To this end, 
we specify in Fig. 4 below the five key challenges facing the Bluetooth-based scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 4. Key challenges facing the Bluetooth based contact-tracing Apps for COVID-19. 
Note that existing decentralised tracing Apps such as Austria’s Stopp Corona are issuing a 
static unique digital ID to each user with rolling public and private keys (keeping the message 
encrypted and increasing the data protection standard). However, if the digital ID is unique and 
static, it runs the risk that certain digital ID could be hacked and paired with a mobile device, thus 
compromising the individual privacy. Thereby, a rolling base digital ID to mitigate this vulnerability 
would be a better practice. In the practical situation, this would be relatively easy to tailor and 
optimise compared with other related challenges. Furthermore, mobile devices exhibit a variety of 
Bluetooth signal intensity at the ISM band, i.e. the capability of each mobile device to determine the 
social distance precisely can vary. Accordingly, it is of research and development interest regarding 
how this can be manipulated (converted) in a unified framework that regulates different generations 
of devices to communicate and share data with each other. Other factors, such as the multipath 
interference and spatial blockage between devices are also urgent yet promising research areas that 
could tip the balance on the functional performance and fault tolerance of the Bluetooth based 
contact tracking.  
5. Conclusion 
This work reviews the states-of-the-art contact-tracing Apps for the COVID-19. A systematic 
mapping of the global deployment architectures and technologies is proposed, with a detailed 
analysis of the flaws for each scenario presented. Specifically, the key challenges facing the Bluetooth 
based solutions are identified to assist the health informatics decision-making concerning the UK’s 
current status in COVID-19 (see Appendix A for an exponential fitting performed to model the 
cumulative cases up to date).   
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Appendix A 
Fig. 5 below presents an exponential fitting of the cumulative number of COVID-19 cases in the 
UK from 31 December 2019 to 5 May 2020, with an R square of 97.1%. 
 
 
Figure 5. Exponential fitting of the cumulative COVID-19 cases in the UK from 31 December 2019 to 
5 May 2020.  
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